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In We The People: Transformations, Bruce Ackerman draws attention
to the radical disjuncture between the version of American constitutional
history underlying formal legal theories of constitutional change and the
actual history of constitutional change in the United States.' This is an
observation with which any constitutional historian would agree. It is
obvious to anyone studying the history of our constitutional system that the
Constitution we live under today is radically different from the one
Americans lived under before the Civil War and before the New Deal.
In this Article, I will discuss several issues precipitated by a reading of
Ackerman's effort to fashion a new theory of constitutional change from a
consideration of actual constitutional history. Part I considers the challenge
constitutional history, as written in recent decades, poses to traditional
theories of constitutional doctrine. It describes Ackerman's work as an
effort to formulate a new theory of doctrinal change that is consistent with
constitutional history. Part II discusses differences between historians' and
lawyers' approaches to historical research. Part III assesses Ackerman's
description of the Reconstruction era and the Framing and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV argues that Republicans did not see their
actions as setting a precedent for "unconventional" transformations of the
Constitution and that their rhetoric stressed the conservatism of the
Reconstruction program. Part V posits an aspect of American
constitutionalism-what might be termed a "preservation theme" -that is
at odds with the radicalism of "transformative moments" and of which
Ackerman must take account in developing his theory. Finally, Part VI
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discusses whether unconventional amendment may be superior to
conventional amendment of the Constitution.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Those assessing constitutional change from a legal perspective address
it in terms of constitutional amendments and court decisions-especially
the decisions of the Supreme Court. Amendments are perceived as the
mode that the Framers formally provided for altering the Constitution; the
legitimacy of constitutional changes proposed and ratified in accordance
with Article V has been largely unquestioned.2 Responses to changes in
social, cultural, and economic conditions, or changes in ethical and
philosophic concepts that have required departures from "original
understandings" of constitutional provisions through judicial interpretations
have been controversial. But no analyst denies that they have occurred; we
have had, for good or ill, a "living Constitution." 3
As a matter of legal theory, the legitimacy of constitutional change
outside the formal amendment process is a critical issue. A radical change
in direction-such as the switch in time that, if it did not really save nine,
did save the New Deal 4 -poses serious problems for theorists seeking to
2. During the Civil War and Reconstruction, a few conservatives argued that what became the
13th and 14th Amendments were illegitimate because they did not merely amend the existing
constitutional system but fundamentally altered it, thus going beyond the intentions of the
Framers. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CoNsTTtrmON, 1776-1995, at 160 (1996). The "ratification" in 1992 of the 27th Amendment,
originally proposed in 1791, raises the question of whether any ratification meeting the formal
requirements of Article Five must be considered legitimate and effectual. The ratification of that
Amendment, 200 years after its proposal by Congress, fell far short of the process that Bruce
Ackerman persuasively argues underlies Article Five-intensive, reasoned debate by an energized
electorate, representing an opinion so deeply and broadly held that it can overcome the obstacles
the Framers purposefully put in its way. Although the same may be said of many of the prior 26
Amendments, the 27th is an extreme case. See Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501, 503 (1994) (referring to
"the Amendment's curious history"); Christopher M. Kennedy, Is There a Twenty-Seventh
Amendment? The Unconstitutionality of a "New" 203-Year-Old Amendment, 26 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 977, 978-79 (1993); Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 101, 102 (1994).
3. The term probably dates to the publication of HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING
CONsTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE REALITIES AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL
LAW (1927). Of course, the idea of a "living Constitution" can be understood narrowly to mean
only that established principles are applied to new situations. This is a view with which Chief
Justice Rehnquist said, "scarcely anyone would disagree." William Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TAX L. REV. 693, 694 (1976). It has come to mean, however, that the
principles themselves change over time.
4. Compare United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that the
federal government may regulate wages and hours of employees who produce goods intended for
interstate commerce, irrespective of the 10th Amendment), Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937) (holding that the 10th Amendment does not limit federal taxation power), NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that the federal government may
regulate labor relations in any industry directly or indirectly affecting interstate commerce), and
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establish principled bases for court decisions. The lines of decisions
defining due process of law and federal power over interstate commerce
that followed the change were logically incompatible with the decisions that
preceded it. The New Deal Court dealt with the problem in the orthodox
manner, by dismissing the pre-1937 lines of decisions as misguided.
Ultimately, the prior line came to be seen as the illegitimate imposition of
the economic and political biases of previous courts upon constitutional
decisionmaking. Reflecting the orthodox myth, Justice Black solemnly
intoned in 1963 that the Court had "returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies." 6
By contrast, the Warren Court openly relied on the idea of a "living
Constitution" in Brown v. Board of Education.7 It repudiated the authority
of original intent in resolving the segregation problem, explaining that "we
cannot turn the clock back to 1868" ;' it relied on sociological data and
analyses of changes in contemporary society, insisting that "[w]e must
consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that minimum-wage legislation does
not deprive employers and employees of freedom of contract in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment), with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that
the federal government may not regulate wages and hours in employments that only indirectly
affect interstate commerce), United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding that the federal
government may not levy taxes to enact programs in areas reserved to the states by the 10th
Amendment), Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that the
federal government may not enact safety and health regulations for businesses that only indirectly
affect interstate commerce), Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that
minimum-wage legislation deprives employers and employess of freedom of contract in violation
of the due process clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments), Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922) (holding that the federal government may not levy taxes to enforce programs in
areas reserved to the state jurisdiction by the 10th Amendment), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that the federal government may not bar goods from entry into interstate
commerce to enforce programs in areas reserved to state jurisdiction by the 10th Amendment).
5. See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S. at 100; West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 379.
6. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,730 (1963). This myth was reflected in the iconic status
accorded the dissents that Oliver Wendell Holmes penned in the Lochner era-especially, his
famous admonition in Lochner itself that "[the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter modified the Court's traditional account in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-2 (1992) (plurality opinion), indicating that the
Lochner line of cases had been premised upon "fundamentally false factual assumptions" about
the free market's ability to secure human welfare. The Supreme Court placed its solemn
imprimatur on the myth of a return to a correct, nationalistic understanding of federalism in
Darby, 312 U.S. at 115, which cited the "now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes" in Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918). It is a sign of the deep conflict between liberal and
conservative constitutionalism on the Court that, while Justice Souter repeated the traditional
account in his dissenting opinion in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604-07 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting), Justice Thomas directly challenged it in a concurring opinion, insisting that, "[i]f
anything, the 'wrong tura' was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a century and a
half of precedent." Id. at 599 (Thomas, J., concurring).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Id. at 492.
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place in American life...." 9 As Robert J. Harris observed: "The Court has
never been more candid in basing a reversal of precedent on changing
conditions and new developments alone than it was here."o At no point in
Brown did the Court hold that the 1896 decision sustaining segregation,
Plessy v. Ferguson," was wrongly decided; it was simply outmoded.
Nonetheless, this approach has failed to persuade many legal analysts, who
generally approve of the decision, that Brown advances a "neutral
principle" -that is, a principle that can transcend time.' Even the Warren
Court's staunchest defenders have conceded that in Brown "the distinction
between judgment and will, already tenuous, was honored only in the
breach." 3 As Arthur S. Miller later observed:
It would be perhaps... desirable that these changes when they do
come, could be justified and explained on the basis of law as it has
been received and understood, on what is sometimes called
"principle." But... the likelihood of such a desirable state of
affairs would seem to be remote at best. The "living" Constitution
carries with it attributes of fiat.1
4
In contrast to lawyers, historians have little problem with the idea that
law changes over time in ways that legal principles and reasoning cannot
explain. In general, constitutional history is no longer primarily the history
of constitutional law. Most constitutional historians attend more broadly to
9. Id.
10. Robert J. Harris, The Constitution, Education, and Segregation, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 431
(1956).
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958); Eugene Cook & William
I. Potter, The School Segregation Cases: Opposing the Opinion of the Supreme Court, 42 A.B.A.
J. 313, 313 (1956); Harris, supra note 10, at 432; H. Gifford Irion, The Constitutional Clock: A
Horological Inquiry, 46 GEo. LJ. 443, 451 (1958); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (1959). In 1971, Judge J. Skelly Wright
complained that "the Warren years were marked by ... an increasingly dissatisfied and prolific
group of legal scholars." J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel the Scholarly Tradition, and the
Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 770 (1971). Nearly 25 years later, a commentator still
wrote of "the seemingly endless articulation of dissatisfaction with the opinion of the Court" in
the school segregation cases. Norman C. Amaker, The Haunting Presence of the Opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 3, 3 (1995). For examples of such commentary,
see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 74-
84 (1990); J. HARViE WILKINSON m, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 28-39 (1979); Paul F. Campos,
Forty Years in the Desert, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 109 (1995); Edward J. Erler, Sowing the Wind:
Judicial Oligarchy and the Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
399 (1985); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 631, 636-37
(1993); Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion to Brown, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93 (1995); and Michael
J. Perry, Brown, Boiling and Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner (Among Others) Are
Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53 (1995).
13. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 207 (rev. ed.
1968).
14. ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, in SOCIAL
CHANGE AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 343,357 (1979).
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constitutionalism and its manifestations in society, law, and politics. They
understand constitutional change as emanating from deeper sources than.
court opinions and formal constitutional amendments, and view
constitutional law as the formal and institutional manifestation of deeper
social and intellectual structures. As a consequence, constitutional
historians now seek to understand the intellectual, social, economic, and
cultural context in which legal doctrines were developed and judicial
decisions were handed down, although as legal scholars they recognize the
powerful effect of legal training, conventions, and reasoning on shaping
both doctrine and decisions. 5
Acceptance of this broader perspective has made traditional legal
accounts of constitutional change appear inadequate to historians. It seems
to be making traditional accounts appear decreasingly adequate to legal
scholars as well. In this Symposium, Stephen M. Griffin urges legal
scholars to abandon legal approaches to constitutional change and to
historicize fully their understanding of it. 6 Constitutional change is
continuous and incremental, effected not only by courts but through the
actions of governmental institutions to which legal scholars rarely attend.
Griffin concludes that constitutional change must be explained by politics,
not theory.' 7 He concedes that such an understanding of constitutional
change cannot provide a theory to guide judges, and legal academics should
abandon the effort: "[T]heories of judicial review and constitutional
interpretation... should be developed in accordance with scholarly values,
not the values of lawyering or judging." "
Ackerman aspires to do what Griffin eschews. He hopes to close the
gap between legal theories of constitutional change and historical reality to
find historically grounded authority for the articulation of new doctrines of
constitutional law. Ackerman recognizes that the continual, incremental
process of constitutional change Griffin describes cannot provide guidance
for principled judicial decisionmaking. He therefore concentrates on the
major "transformative" moments that affect large swaths of the law and
legitimize major shifts in doctrine. Ackerman is motivated to focus on
transformative moments precisely because he fears the implications of
15. For example, see the empathetic (not sympathetic) account of Plessy v. Ferguson in
CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987). For
similarly empathetic discussions of Lochner-era laissez-faire constitutionalism, see HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER-ERA POLICE
POWER JURISPRUDENCE (1993); DAVID GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW:
JOHN APPLETON AND RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM (1990); and Michael Les Benedict, Laissez
Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293 (1985).
16. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115 (1999).
17. Cf. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS
(1996) (connecting constitutional interpretation with political institutions).
18. Id. at76.
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simply accepting the idea that constitutional principles are historically
contingent. He is as troubled as originalists at the prospect of unconstrained
judges. But while originalists complain that liberal judges lawlessly write
their ideology into the Constitution, Ackerman fears the consequences of
unshackled judicial conservatism.
A historicized view of constitutional change undermines the legitimacy
of post-New Deal liberal constitutionalism by challenging the historical
myth upon which it has rested-that the Supreme Court's post-1937
decisions embodied a correct reading of the Constitution, setting aside
earlier, erroneous doctrines of laissez-faire constitutionalism and state
rights that were illegitimate expressions of judges' personal preferences.
Constitutional historians have demonstrated that laissez-faire
constitutionalism developed out of longstanding American constitutional
commitments and reflected fundamental epistemological beliefs that
prevailed in late nineteenth-century American society. The transformation
of constitutional law in the New Deal did not "correct" a misguided
reading of the Constitution, but rather represented the influence of new
styles of reasoning and new social understandings that had triumphed more
generally in the nation.19
These understandings do more than simply challenge the constitutional
myth that legitimated liberal constitutionalism; the idea that changes in
constitutional law reflect deeper changes in American society, culture, and
ideology suggests that the present trend towards a revival of laissez-faire
constitutionalism and state-rights federalism is another manifestation of the
same phenomenon. These historical understandings provide no basis for
19. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 15, at 10 (arguing that Lochner-era constitutional law was
a longstanding, principled effort to distinguish valid economic legislation from invalid "class"
legislation); MORTON J. HORwrIz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 9-
31 (1992) (describing the structure of "classical" legal thought in the late 19th century); Benedict,
supra note 15 (arguing that laissez-faire constitutionalism reflects a traditional American concern
with avoiding class legislation); Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and 'Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism': A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 752 (1967) (arguing that Cooley's
ideas reflect the survival of the Jeffersonian conception of equal rights in a new economic
environment); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business
Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970
(1975) (showing that Justice Field attempted to separate public and private sectors of life into
fixed, inviolable spheres, based on Jacksonian and antislavery precepts); John V. Orth, Taking
from A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Process and the Case of the Shifting Paradigm, 14
CONST. COMMENTARY 337 (1997) (tracing the ancient lineage of the concept underlying
substantive due process of law); Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST.
REv. 215 (1995) (describing classical legal thought in the late 19th century, as reflected in the
career of a leading law writer); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the Lochner-era marked a
transition from an era of treating law as the embodiment of fixed natural law and common-law
concepts to one of treating constitutional law as the outcome of pragmatic interest-balancing);
Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare
State, 72 YALE L.J. 286 (1962) (arguing that laissez-faire constitutionalism reflected the reality
that the state's ability to deal with social problems was severely limited in the 19th century).
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saying that one set of constitutional principles is correct while another is
wrong.
Ackerman is troubled on both counts. As he makes clear in his criticism
of Justice Souter's opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2" the
traditional account of constitutional change that relies on the traditional
story of the errors of laissez-faire constitutionalism is more fiction than
historical fact and cannot impart the legitimacy law requires.21 But
Ackerman wants to accomplish more. Despite his careful attention to the
Founding and the Reconstruction-era, Ackerman's primary purpose is to
construct a theory of constitutional change that legitimizes the liberal
constitutional heritage of the New Deal while denying legitimacy to
conservative challengers, at least until the American people endorse it
through a similar process of what Ackerman calls "higher lawmaking." "
In carrying out his project, Ackerman asks essentially legal questions of
historical evidence. With regard to the Reconstruction era, he asks: What is
the meaning of the events leading up to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment for present constitutional law? This question must be divided
into two subquestions: (1) what happened; and (2) what legal or
constitutional rules or principles can we derive from what happened? The
first is a historical question; the second, and for Ackerman the more
important, is not.
I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO HISTORICAL RESEARCH
People have disagreed about the purpose of historical research. From
the beginning many have argued that the main reason to recount history is
for the specific lessons we can learn from it. The Chinese prepared
immense compilations of historical data to educate officials in the art of
20. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
21. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 400-01.
22. 2 id. at 389-400. For a similar conclusion, see Rogers M. Smith, Legitimating
Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE L.J. 2039 (1999). New Deal constitutionalism
is being challenged vigorously by "takings" doctrines that echo the due-process-of-law doctrines
central to laissez-faire constitutionalism and by doctrines of "federalism" that echo pre-New Deal
dual federalism. For the former, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), which held that
a requirement that a business turn over land for use as a bicycle path in return for a redevelopment
permit constitutes a "taking" in violation of the Fifth Amendment as applied through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). There remain echoes of dual federalism. See U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 10th
Amendment reserves to the people of each state the power to set term limits for representatives to
the United States Congress); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that
federal government cannot compel states to "take tile" to radioactive waste); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
federal government cannot regulate state and local employees carrying out traditional state and
local functions).
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governing. Indeed, the great Ssu-ma Kuang called his monumental history
of China from the fifth century B.C. to the tenth century A.D.
Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government. 3 Plutarch described history
as a "looking-glass, in which I may see how to adjust and adorn my own
life," by selecting from the actions of men and women in the past "all that
is noblest and worthiest to know." 24 It became a well-known aphorism that
history was "philosophy learned from example."' History taught moral
lessons; this, in turn, required historians to make moral judgments about the
conduct of historical actors. "Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise
and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity," said the
great historian Lord Acton in his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of
Modern History at Cambridge in 1895.26 In sum, historians often sought to
identify permanent lessons that seemed to be timeless, beyond the
contingencies of immediate context.
Acton issued his article of faith in response to new ideas already
entering history and other disciplines investigating the human condition.
Historians came to perceive that forces played a greater role than
individuals in history. Along with the practitioners of new social sciences
like sociology and anthropology, historians began to treat moral codes as
imbedded in particular cultures and therefore mutable. "Where history is
concerned... there are no universal standards," the eminent twentieth-
century historian Henry Steele Commager explained in 1965, and thus no
grounds for moral judgment.27 "If history 'tells us' anything, it tells us that
standards, values, and principles have varied greatly from age to age and
from society to society."' The consequence of such new understandings
was to redefine the purpose of doing history. The purpose of historical
research is no longer to determine what is timeless but rather to analyze
what is transient and especially to explain how and why things change. It is
within the context of these changes in the purpose of history that
constitutional historians have developed their more sophisticated
understandings of the nature of constitutional change.
23. William G. Beasly & E.G. Pulleyblank, Introduction to HISTORIANS OF CHINA AND
JAPAN 7 (William G. Beasly & E.G. Pulleyblank eds., 1961). The notion persists. See, e.g.,
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR
DECISION-MAKERS at xi-xxii (1986) (showing how policymakers can benefit from historical
knowledge).
24. PLUTARCH, LIvES OFTHE NOBLE GREEKS 204 (Edmund Fuller ed., 1959).
25. BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 100 (16th ed. 1992) (attributing the aphorism to
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, c. 54-7 B.C.).
26. John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton), The Study of History, in 2 SELECTED
WRrrINGS OF LORD ACTON: ESSAYS IN THE STUDY AND WRITING OF HISTORY 504,551 (J. Rufus
Fears ed., 1985).




Although some nineteenth-century historians were swept up by the
hope that "social science" would tell us immutable truths about human
behavior, the ultimate result of the intellectual revolution of the turn of the
twentieth century was to reinforce what is now known as "historicism" -
the idea that one studies history for its own sake, for the general self-
knowledge and vicarious experience we derive from humane studies.
Within the American historical academy, this justification has become
predominant.
Despite modem historians' skepticism, it is still common to be told that
history teaches some definite lesson or justifies some specific prediction.
Some subfields of history are particularly likely to raise such possibilities,
and constitutional history is one of them. History can provide strong
authority for a legal argument, and it is intimately bound up with the search
for legal precedents, legislative intent, and original understandings of
constitutional provisions. Nonetheless, legal questions are not the sort of
questions historians normally put to historical evidence. They generally ask
what happened, why it happened, and what were the historical
consequences of its happening. Professor Ackerman, in contrast, is asking a
question that stands outside of time: What is the permanent legal or
constitutional principle that we can extract from an analysis of individual
episodes of change? At the same time, however, Ackerman does want to
make a contribution to our historical understanding of Reconstruction. He
succeeds.
Ackerman joins a long line of eminent historians and legal scholars
who have addressed the role the Constitution played in Reconstruction and
the role Reconstruction played in American constitutional history. The
seceding states' anomalous situation at war's end precipitated a powerful
debate over how to understand the constitutional relations between the
Union and the ex-Confederate states at war's end. The struggle over
Reconstruction led to the first impeachment of a President and to deep
strains between Congress and the Supreme Court. The ex-Confederate
states were twice required to refashion their state Constitutions. All sides
employed constitutional arguments as central elements of their appeals for
popular support. Thus, people's understanding of constitutional
requirements played a crucial role in the struggle over Reconstruction
policy. Much of the history of Reconstruction has been constitutional
history.29
29. See, e.g., JOHN Wv. BURGESS, REcONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1866-1876
(1902); WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, The Constitution of the United States in Reconstruction,
in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL VAR AND REcONSTRUCTION, AND RELATED TopIcs 63 (1898). Later,
"revisionist" historians, like Howard K. Beale, concluded that economic issues lay under the
Reconstruction struggle, dismissing the constitutional rhetoric of the time as mere "claptrap."
See, e.g., HOWARD K. BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR: A STUDY OF ANDREW JOHNSON AND
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If constitutional arguments affected the course of Reconstruction, so
too did the needs of Reconstruction affect the Constitution. Among the
consequences of the struggle were three constitutional amendments, one of
which-the Fourteenth-has been immensely fruitful and controversial in
its applications. As such it has attracted the attention not only of historians
whose main interest is in chronicling American constitutional development,
but of legal scholars whose main interest is in discerning the original
meaning of the Amendment in order to determine how it should be applied
in contemporary constitutional law."0
In any kind of investigation, the research question determines what
evidence is relevant. Furthermore, the research question can affect the
research method. The problem with doing historical research to answer
legal questions is that the legal researcher needs to arrive at relatively
unambiguous answers, which historical research does not usually provide.
This need for clear answers often affects how the question is conceived. For
example, the legal researcher might ask, was the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to make segregation unconstitutional? The historian would be
more likely to ask, how did different Americans understand the impact of
the Fourteenth Amendment on racial segregation at the time it was ratified?
It is a difference of tone rather than of substance, but the second version
invites ambiguity, while the first seeks specificity. It would not at all
trouble the purely historical researcher that Americans had mixed or unclear
understandings. On the contrary, that is what a historian would expect to
find. But for the purpose of using history as present-day legal authority,
RECONSTRUCTION 8-9 (1930). But the "neo-revisionists" of the 1960s and 1970s once again
stressed constitutional issues. See, e.g., HERMAN BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS:
POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1978); HERMAN BELZ,
RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND PRACTICE DURING THE CIvIL WAR (1969);
MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869 (1974) [hereinafter BENEDICT, COMPROMISE]; MICHAEL LES
BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1973); HAROLD M. HYMAN,
A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIviL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE
CONSTITUTION (1973); ERIC L. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960);
JAMES E. SEFTON, ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE USES OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (1980).
30. Classic examples are Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); and Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
Remaining influential today are RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986);
CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88: PART ONE (1971); EARL MALTz, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); and Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 863 (1986).
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such ambiguity renders the answer to the legal researcher's question
useless, as the Supreme Court famously found in Brown."
For the historian, the important question would be how and why
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment's relationship to segregation
changed over time. To a legal researcher seeking historical authority for
contemporary law, such changes in understandings would be legally
irrelevant, no matter how historically interesting they are. To arrive at a
legally useful answer, the legal researcher must reduce the ambiguity that
historians expect to find in any investigation. She either has to determine
whether she can identify a best answer, or she must concede that history
cannot provide one. As the eminent legal historian John Phillip Reid has put
it, "The search for authority, the need to find 'the law' or 'the right law' is
the main reason lawyers speak of the legal past in terms different from the
historian's." "
One can see the problem by looking at influential work that law-
oriented legal historians, such as Charles Fairman, Raoul Berger, Earl
Maltz, and Michael Kent Curtis, have undertaken on Reconstruction. In
each case, a primary purpose of their research has been to discover the
original intent or understanding of the Framers of Reconstruction-era
legislation and constitutional amendments, and they have used a variety of
techniques to distill clear answers from murky evidence. For example, in
his concise and informed study, Maltz limited his research to the public
record, eschewing private correspondence, diaries, and similar sources, on
the principle that the Framing and ratification of the Constitution was a
public process.3 He interpreted arguments within the framework of the
legal culture of the time, assuming the language reflected contemporaneous
legal meanings. 4 He thus privileged legal over general understandings of
language.35 He stressed the importance of language that appeared to have
been rejected in the course of Framing the Amendment as a guide to what
the final language meant.36 He suggested that a lack of opposition to a
provision implied a restrictive understanding of it, since expansive
proposals precipitated resistance.37 Finally, he implicitly, but clearly,
indicated that since the Amendment could not have passed without the
support of conservative Republicans, who articulated the most restrictive
interpretation of its scope, their views carried special weight." One may
disagree with some or all of them, but these are reasonable tests to bring to
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,489 (1954).
32. John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 196 (1993).




37. See id. at 104-05.
38. See id passim.
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bear if one is searching for the best answer from ambiguous and
contradictory evidence. After applying them, Professor Maltz was gratified
that he could discern "a relatively clear picture of the original
understanding of the Reconstruction amendments." 39
Both Fairman and Berger weighed evidence by the logical coherence of
the arguments that appear in the sources, and by the legal acumen of their
authors. Finding "a degree of imprecision ... throughout the deliberations"
on the Civil War-era amendments, Fairman found a "need to distinguish
between sanguine prophecies and cold propositions about legal
consequences." 40 He relied on the latter and dismissed the former, although
the main difference was that the "sanguine prophecies" suggested a
broader meaning for the amendments than the "cold propositions." 4 Both
Fairman and Berger scouted the legal acumen of Senator Jacob M. Howard
and Representative John A. Bingham, key Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore discounted the evidentiary value of their
statements.42 Fairman dismissed Bingham, who was, after all, merely the
author of the first Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, as follows:
"When one studies Bingham carefully one learns that many of his
utterances cannot be accepted as serious propositions." 43 Michael Kent
Curtis, asking similar questions, has trenchantly criticized Fairman and
Berger's conclusions. Using a wider array of sources and denouncing
narrowly legalistic analyses of them, Curtis admitted that "absolute
certainty is impossible" in historical research. 4 But in the end, he presented
something pretty close to it-what "the history of those years shows, as
clearly as history shows anything."45
All researchers need to group discrete phenomena in coherent
categories that enable one to make generalizations. Asking different
questions of the data, historians and lawyers group discrete phenomena into
different categories. Ackerman's work illustrates the differences. His
purpose is to discover a process characteristic of transformative moments in
general. He categorizes events as signaling, triggering, and consolidating
constitutional transformations. This serves his legal purpose, but it does not
39. Id. at xii.
40. FAIRMAN, supra note 30, at 1134-35.
41. See Michael Les Benedict, Review: Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Volume VI, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88: Part One, 39 U. CHi. L. REv. 862, 866
(1972) (book review).
42. See RAOUL BERGER, THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 128-42
(1989); BERGER, supra note 30, at 145, 219; FAIRMAN, supra note 30, at 1275, 1287-89, 1291-95;
Fairman, supra note 30, at 30-37, 54, 55-58.
43. FAIRMAN, supra note 30, at 1289.
44. CURTIS, supra note 30, at 16.
45. Id. at 220.
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relate to the kind of questions most historians would ask. His categories are
therefore not those historians would likely find useful or compelling.
To most professional historians, both clarity and categorization are the
result of a researcher's principles of selecting and assessing evidence; they
are not inherent in the evidence itself. Historians, not asking such questions
of the evidence, not expecting clear answers and under no compulsion to
provide them, simply do not use the criteria legal researchers do to sift it.
Historians, especially historians of law and constitutionalism, appreciate
many of these analyses for their intellectual power, and for their suggestive
insights and illuminating new information. But they are often critical of
them as histories, because of their tendency to simplify and reduce the
evidence according to principles that historians do not generally find
appropriate in their own research. They see the necessary effort to reduce
ambiguity as oversimplification.
m1'. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
One of the attractions of Ackerman's work for a historian is that he is
not mining the historical evidence for a definite understanding of specific
constitutional provisions. He takes a genuinely historical approach to the
historical part of his question-the question of what happened during
Reconstruction. His account of events corresponds closely to those of
leading historians. But, as is true of any history, his research question
shapes his perspective. He is interested in what happened primarily for what
it tells us about how Americans have amended their Constitution-a story
that he rightly insists goes beyond the conventional one that stresses the
formal processes of Article V. He selects which events to describe and then
discusses and categorizes them almost entirely within that context. The
result is a powerful new interpretation of the proposal and ratification of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that nonetheless focuses so tightly
on that subject that it obscures the larger context-for the real story of the
development of national Reconstruction policy is the triangular struggle
among President Andrew Johnson and his supporters, conservative and
centrist Republicans, and Radical Republicans. The issue was how far the
federal government would go to change the balance of power in the restored
central government and to what extent it would change political, social, and
economic power relationships in the Southern states. Whether and how to
secure the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was merely a part of
that story, as Ackerman well understands.
By concentrating so closely on the Fourteenth Amendment, Ackerman
implies that it was the heart of the postwar settlement. All the maneuvering,
he indicates, was over its ratification. But that account distorts the situation.
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The Fourteenth Amendment was the heart of the first settlement that
Republicans offered the South. As Ackerman indicates, centrist
Republicans at first resisted further Reconstruction measures. 6 Forced by
Southern recalcitrance to move forward, some of them hoped to keep the
Amendment the centerpiece of the program. Most of them joined more
Radical Republicans, however, to require Southern states to frame new
constitutions enfranchising African Americans. Thus, the passage of the
Reconstruction Acts instituted a second Reconstruction program that went
considerably further than the first. While ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment was an important element of that program, most Republicans
considered the enfranchisement of African Americans, not the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the most important accomplishment of
Reconstruction-" the capstone of the edifice-the keystone of the arch,"
in the words of the Chicago Tribune.47 Not only did enfranchisement
symbolically incorporate African Americans fully into the American nation,
it promised a fundamental restructuring of power in the South, something
the Fourteenth Amendment made no pretense of doing. The initial
Republican program, of which the Fourteenth Amendment was the
centerpiece, had been designed primarily to accomplish the restoration of
the Union. Its delegation of power to the federal government to protect civil
rights was merely a vague promise, particularly shaky in light of the federal
government's traditional impotence in protecting the rights of racial
minorities. It was a promise made precisely because the first Republican
program left black Southerners without political power in their states. Only
black enfranchisement, in the words of the Chicago Tribune, would
"terminate forever the long disturbance of the public peace over the civil
and political status of the black man."' That proved a false hope, but then
so did any expectation that the Fourteenth Amendment would do the job.
Despite this undue stress on the importance of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Reconstruction, We the People: Transfonnations provides
important insights. No historian before has recognized the implications of
the language of Secretary of State Seward's announcements of the
ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. No historian has
so clearly indicated the importance of what Ackerman calls the
"constitutional calendar'-the pressure imposed on Republicans by the
regular cycle of elections. No historian has better explained President
46. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 193-98.
47. The Suffrage Amendment, CtI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 1869, at 2; see also BENEDICT,
COMPROMISE, supra note 29, at 210-43 (detailing the development of congressional
Reconstruction legislation and black suffrage).
48. The Suffrage Amendment, supra note 47, at 2.
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Andrew Johnson's strategy.49 Johnson emerges from Ackerman's account
not as a blind and stubborn obstructionist, but as a clever tactician cannily
exploiting the advantages he held in the fight over the Fourteenth
Amendment and over Reconstruction in general.
Ackerman avoids the risk of oversimplification by eschewing any effort
to explain exactly what the specific provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment meant to its Framers or the people of the United States who
ratified it. He is concerned with the process, not with the specific
provisions. But can he avoid the problem of original meaning this way?
Ackerman's main point is that the American people can amend their
Constitution in ways other than those specified by Article V, and his
purpose is to establish the legitimacy of such changes. But to what end? He
indicates that judges and other legal actors must accept the changes thus
made. This must mean that they are bound to render judgments in
accordance with them. But Ackerman is content with generalized
statements about what exactly changed. He never details the provisions of
the Amendment, analyzes its language, assesses the legal meaning of its
terms, or delves into the origins of its concepts. The most important effect
of the Fourteenth Amendment, he indicates, was to declare the primacy of
national over state citizenship, and even here he stresses more the
nationalistic process by which it was enacted than its language."0 Does this
assessment of the Amendment's purpose provide enough specificity to
guide and constrain lawmakers and judges?
It may be that Ackerman offers no more definitive meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the process he describes did not provide
any. He is certainly correct that the conflict between the President and
Congress over Reconstruction triggered a greater public engagement in
politics and policymaking than usual. Anyone who looks at the private
correspondence of public figures will be struck by the number of letters
they received on the subject. As one who is researching national
Reconstruction policy after 1868, I can assure readers that the volume trails
off dramatically." The congressional elections of 1866, which Ackerman
says were a central event in the ongoing process of "higher lawmaking," 
52
reflected this interest. The median voter turnout in the Northern and border
49. Perhaps most similar in its portrayal of Johnson as a cunning political tactician is HANS L.
TREFOUSSE, IMPEACHMENT OF A PRESIDENT: ANDREW JOHNSON, THE BLACKS, AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1975).
50. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 198-205.
51. For my book A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 29, I researched over 155
collections of correspondence at over 25 repositories. A list may be found in iU at 450-53.
52. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 178-83. Ackerman uses the term "higher lawmaking"
throughout the book.
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states was higher that any other non-presidential year congressional election
in the Civil War/Reconstruction era."3
Voters were not energized, however, over the specific content of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but over the general issue of how quickly and
under what conditions to restore the Union. As Stephen A. Hurlbut, a
leading southern Illinois politician and later congressman, reported to
Thaddeus Stevens as the Thirty-Ninth Congress organized in December
1865, "The people care little for Constitutional hair splitting as to the legal
status of rebeldom & its communities. They care much as regards their
admission to political power in their existing frame of mind &
prejudices."54 The Fourteenth Amendment became a central element of the
controversy, and, as Ackerman reports, the principal issue of the critical
congressional elections of 1866.55
But rarely-indeed, one might say never-in the months that Congress
framed the Amendment or during the canvass of 1866 did newspapers or
campaign speakers carefully dissect it. Never did they explain exactly what
due process of law or equal protection meant. They probably did not know.
Representative George S. Boutwell, who served on the committee that
framed the Amendment, remembered how persistently Bingham pressed for
the inclusion of his due process and equal protection language. "Its
euphony and indefiniteness of meaning were a charm to him," Boutwell
recalled.56 As William E. Nelson has pointed out, "The framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment simply never took advantage of the many
opportunities they had to specify its precise boundaries.", 7 Their purpose
was not to provide future judges with clear guidelines for its application
but, in Nelson's words again, "to reaffirm the lay public's longstanding
rhetorical commitment to general principles of equality, individual rights,
53. The estimated median turnout in the Northern and border states was 61.2% in 1866,
compared to 56.4%, 57.9%, and 57.3% in the congressional elections of 1862, 1870, and 1874.
The figures are based upon election and census data obtainable from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. See Walter Dean Burnham et
al., State-level Congressional, Gubernatorial and Senatorial Election Data for the United States,
1824-1972, available in <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi>; Walter Dean Burnham et al., State-
level Presidential Election Data for the United States, 1824-1972, available in
<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi>. Walter Dean Burnham found the 1866 turnout in Ohio the
highest in the state's history. See Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated
Equilibria: An Outsider Looks at Bruce Ackerman's We The People, 108 YALE L.J. 2248 (1999).
54. Letter from Stephen A. Hurlbut to Thaddeus Stevens (Dec. 25, 1865), in 2 SELECTED
PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEvENS 58 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed., 1998).
55. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 178-83.
56. 2 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 42
(1902).
57. NELSON, supra note 30, at 7. In what is recognized as the standard study of
Reconstruction, Eric Foner agrees: "Republicans rejected calls to define these [specific provisions
of the Amendment] with precision." ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUtIoN, 1863-1877, at 257 (1988).
2026 [Vol. 108:2011
Benedict
and local self-rule., 5 8 Or, I would say, to confirm the national
government's power to intervene when state policy violated or encouraged
the violation of those general principles.
IV. THE CONSERVATIVE RHETORIC OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION
Giving the national government that vaguely articulated power raised
powerful opposition, strong enough, as Ackerman demonstrates, to have
defeated a constitutional amendment for that purpose in ordinary times. Of
course, as Ackerman so eloquently demonstrates, the times were not
ordinary. But in what way were they extraordinary? Ackerman stresses that
they were extraordinary in that the American people and their political
leaders had gone into a "higher lawmaking" mode. 9 Ackerman sees such
higher lawmaking as a rare but regular element of the American
constitutional system, with the unconventional events of Reconstruction
setting a precedent for similar unconventional amendments of the
Constitution in the future. But that is certainly not how Republicans
themselves saw it. Searching for constitutional justifications of their
actions, Republicans ultimately rejected those that relied upon permanent,
peacetime provisions of the Constitution, such as the Guarantee Clause.6"
Instead, they relied on a principle that promised to make their reliance on
extraordinary measures a one-time event. They justified the extraordinary
requirement that ex-Confederate states ratify constitutional amendments as
a price of restoration by claiming that it was the legitimate consequence of
the war. As Richard Henry Dana put it in his influential analysis of the
constitutional position, "The conquering party may hold the other in the
grasp of war until they submit to such reasonable terms of peace as we may
demand." 6
Ackerman scouts the notion that the Grasp-of-War doctrine is the best
framework in which to understand the forced ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, saying flatly that it is "bad history."62 It is not clear what he
means by this. As the historian who has argued most strongly that the
Grasp-of-War doctrine was the theory most widely accepted among
Republicans,63 I have a special interest in knowing. After calling it "bad
58. NELSON, supra note 30, at 8.
59. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 3,207.
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government.").
61. Richard H. Dana, Jr., Speech at the Meeting in Faneuil, Boston (June 23, 1865), in N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1865, at 8, reprinted in RICHARD HENRY DANA, JR., SPEECHES IN STIRRING
TIMES AND LETrERS TO A SON 243-59,246 (Richard Dana III ed., 1910).
62. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 115.
63. See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of
Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65, 72-76 (1974).
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history," Ackerman says that the Grasp-of-War theory is the result of a
"misguided jurisprudence which restricts our choices to a sharp
dichotomy" between formalistic commitment to Article V or a process in
which "force reigned." ' This is one of Ackerman's rare opaque sentences.
If he means that historians relied on a jurisprudential analysis to
demonstrate that Republicans relied on the Grasp-of-War theory, he is
plainly wrong. That most Republicans relied on the Grasp-of-War theory to
justify their Reconstruction program emerges from an analysis of what they
said, not the jurisprudential persuasiveness of the argument.65
What Ackerman probably means is that, no matter what Republicans
believed, his account provides a more persuasive constitutional justification
than the Grasp-of-War doctrine. "WThe entire point of this book is to reject
this dichotomy between legalistic perfection and lawless force," he says.66
He may very well have succeeded, but that does not change the fact that
Republicans themselves saw it differently. I do not mean that they saw
themselves as exercising "lawless force." On the contrary, the Grasp-of-
War doctrine provided a legal justification, based on the laws of war, for
conditioning peace upon ratification of constitutional amendments.
Moreover, it appeared to be a more conservative justification than
alternatives that posited the destruction of the Southern states and their
remission to territorial status, or that authorized permanent federal
supervision of state political institutions under the Guarantee Clause.67
Republican efforts to present a moderate face to the electorate raise a
significant problem for Ackerman's thesis. He characterizes the
Reconstruction Act as "a revolutionary act of constituent authority." 61 He
refers to those pressing for the sorts of fundamental constitutional change
he is describing as "revolutionary reformers." 69 Throughout, Ackerman
stresses the radicalism, the "unconventionality" 7  of Republican
Reconstruction. It is central to his thesis that Reconstruction worked a
"transformative" change-another term that appears consistently in his
text.71 For Ackerman, the essence of that transformation was what he calls a
64. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 116.
65. See BENEDICT, COMPROMISE, supra note 29, at 125-26; Benedict, supra note 63, at 72.
66. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 116. In his endnotes, Ackerman cites Laurence Tribe as
"flirt[ing] with this view," rather than citing historians who have discussed the influence of the
Grasp-of-War doctrine. Id. at 446 n.46 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1294 (1995)). This suggests that he is arguing with the
jurisprudential concept rather than the historical fact that it was widely accepted.
67. See Benedict, supra note 63, at 73-74.
68. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 198.
69. 2id. at 13.
70. Ackerman stresses the importance of the "unconventionality" of the higher lawmaking
process in the introductory discussion of his revised understanding of constitutional change, 2 id.




"re-founding" of the United States 7 2-the replacement of the incompletely
nationalized polity established in 1788 with a fully nationalized polity.
Ackerman's description of how the Reconstruction Act and legislation
supplementary to it nationalized the unconventional amending process is
brilliant and compelling.73
Ackerman's emphasis on the radicalism of Reconstruction places him
in good company. It was once a historical axiom that Reconstruction had
been imposed on the South by radical extremists, led by the vengeful
Representative Thaddeus Stevens and the fanatical Senator Charles
Sumner. In the 1960s and 1970s, historians debunked that idea, absolving
Stevens and Sumner of the canards and demonstrating that centrists like
Bingham and Senators William Pitt Fessenden and Lyman Trumbull, the
Chairmen of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the Senate
Judiciary Committee, exercised greater influence! 4 Harold M. Hyman and
his students argued that Reconstruction was a constitutionally conservative
response to the problem of restoring the Union and protecting the rights of
African Americans, designed to preserve the basic contours of the federal
system.75 As noted previously,7 6 William E. Nelson too perceived "local
self-rule" as among the principles reaffirmed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, as has Earl Maltz!' Ackerman joins Robert J. Kaczorowski,
David E. Kyvig, and Eric Foner in challenging that view. Indeed,
Kaczorowski, like Ackerman, perceives the Republicans' purpose in
Reconstruction to have been "to begin the nation anew."78 Kyvig
denominates the Reconstruction era "The Second American Constitutional
Revolution" in his history of constitutional amendments,79 while Foner
refers to the legislation of the era as "a radical departure, a stunning and
72. 2 id. at 198.
73. See id.. at 198-205,209.
74. See, e.g., BENEDICT, COMPROMISE, supra note 29; JOHN H. Cox & LAWANDA COX,
POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE, 1865-1866: DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA
206 (1963); McKrrRICK, supra note 29.
75. See HYNIAN, supra note 29, at 435-45, 543-53; Benedict, supra note 63, at 76; PHILLIP S.
PALUDAN, A COvENANT wrrH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL
WAR ERA 47-54 (1975). Prior to these publications, William R. Brock and Eric McKitrick had
alluded briefly to the constitutional conservatism of the Republican program. See WILLIAM R.
BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1867, at 271-73 (1963);
MCKITRICK, supra note 29, at 117-19. Alfred H. Kelly first posited the argument in a comment on
an early Hyman paper that stressed the radicalism of Republican constitutionalism. Alfred H.
Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN
RECONSTRUCTION 40 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1966).
76. See supra text accompanying note 58.
77. See MALTz, supra note 30, at 157.
78. Kaczorowski, supra note 30, at 863; Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew:
Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REv. 45, 47 (1987); see
also Kaczorowski, supra note 30, at 863 (arguing that, despite their racism, congressional
Republicans believed in national citizenship so strongly that they favored aggressive
Reconstruction).
79. KYVIG, supra note 2, at 154-87.
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unprecedented experiment in interracial democracy."80 While he concedes
more than Kaczorowski and Ackerman by noting that "few Republicans
wished to break completely with the principles of federalism," " Foner too
opines that "[i]n establishing the primacy of a national citizenship whose
common rights the states could not abridge, Republicans carried forward
the state-building process born of the Civil War." 
82
No historian familiar with the legal position of African Americans
before the Civil War can deny that Reconstruction radically altered it. And
giving the federal government the power to intervene to protect civil and
political rights where the state infringed them, or possibly when it failed to
assure them, would have worked a fundamental change in the federal
system. But the fact is that Republicans agonized over the choices they had
to make between preserving federalism and protecting black rights. Faced
with the choice, they opted to protect rights, but they did so in such a way
as to preserve as much as possible of the traditional, state-centered system.
Refusing to transfer primary responsibility for ordinary protection of the
law from the states to the federal government, they mandated essentially
that such protection be provided by the states equally, regardless of race. 3
Whatever they did, Republicans never spoke in the terms Ackerman
uses. Never did they admit that their actions made the ratification of the
Civil War amendments "unconventional." Republicans indicated that the
radical transformation, if any, would be in the status of African Americans.
Never did they concede that they were revolutionizing the federal system.
When they described the effect of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment on federalism, they stressed its conservatism.' The Civil
Rights Bill "may be assailed as drawing to the Federal Government powers
that properly belong to States;" Trumbull acknowledged, "but I apprehend,
rightly considered, it is not obnoxious to that objection. It will have no
operation in any State where the laws are equal, where all persons have the
same civil rights without regard to color or race."8" The Fourteenth
Amendment too left states with the primary authority over ordinary
municipal legislation. As the arch-conservative Republican governor of
Ohio, Jacob D. Cox, explained as he endorsed it:
If these rights are in good faith protected by State laws and State
authorities, there will be no need of federal legislation on the
subject, and the power will remain in abeyance; but if they are
80. FONER, supra note 57, at 278.
81. Id. at 259.
82. Id. at 258.
83. See generally Benedict, supra note 63, at 65 (arguing that Republicans did not wish to
expand dramatically the power of the national government).
84. Id at 76-80.
85. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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systematically violated, those who violate them will be themselves
responsible for all the necessary interference of the central
government. 6
Of course, the second clause carries a significant kicker. But the point
is that when Republicans sought the support of "We the People," they
sought to minimize the radicalism of the change that they were working. In
the congressional elections of 1866, Republicans consistently stressed how
little they asked of Southemers---"hardly anything not approved by the
President," former Governor William Dennison of Ohio insisted. 7
Newspapers that had sustained Johnson acknowledged "the liberal
terms offered by Congress as the price of Reconstruction."" As the
Democratic National Intelligencer complained: "There never was a canvass
conducted by any party so entirely upon false pretenses as the one just
concluded .... By the obscurities of the much-talked-of constitutional
amendment, ... they... conceal[ed] the real objects of the congressional
faction." 9 Since Ackerman claims it is the mandate of the people, given in
the higher lawmaking context of intensified attention and participation, that
legitimizes constitutional transformations, the Republican strategy of
minimizing the transformative potential of the Amendment raises the
problem of interpreting just how far "We the People" thought the
transformation went.90
86. Fairman, supra note 30, at 96 (quoting Cox, Ohio Exec. Doc., Part I, 282 (1867)). Cox
vigorously supported Johnson until he vetoed the Civil Rights bill; he continued to urge
reconciliation with Johnson until he rejected the 14th Amendment. See BENEDICT, COMPROMISE,
supra note 29, at 114, 158-70.
87. William Dennison, Speech at Columbus, Ohio (Aug. 1866), in CLEVELAND HERALD,
Aug. 13, 1866, at 2; see Jacob D. Cox, Speech at the Soldiers and Sailors Convention (Sept. 25,
1866), in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1866, at 1; Jacob D. Cox, Speech at Columbus (Aug. 21, 1866), in
CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866, IN THm STATES OF OHIO,
INDIANA AND KENTUCKY 17 (1866); M.F. Force, Speech at Chillicothe (Sept. 22, 1866), in
CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, supra at 34; James A. Garfield, Speech at Warren, Ohio (Sept. 1,
1866), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 216, 240-41 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882);
John Sherman, Speech at Mozart Hall (Sept. 28, 1866), in CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL, supra at 39.
Republicans worked feverishly to prevent the Southern Loyalists Convention, called to bring
attention to ex-Confederate control in the ex-Confederate states, from undermining the
conservative theme by endorsing black suffrage and other radical measures. See BENEDICT,
COMPROMISE, supra note 29, at 200-02.
88. N.Y. HERALD, Sept. 25, 1866, at 3. For a similar perspective from a congressman who
had supported Andrew Johnson's Reconstruction policy, see The Civil Rights Bill in Congress-
Note from R.S. Hale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1866, at 4 (conceding the conservatism of the proposed
14th Amendment).
89. DAILY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER (Washington), Nov. 10, 1866, at 2.
90. Ackerman's thesis does not require Republicans to share his understanding of the
theoretical implications of their actions. It only requires that his account of their actions and the
context in which they took place be accurate, and that his interpretation of what they mean for
constitutional theory be persuasive. While he points out with regularity and pleasure occasions
when the actors' views coincide with his, he never argues that Republicans or their opponents
consciously acted on the theory of constitutional change he delineates. I am less certain if the
same is true of his discussion of the Founding, because Ackerman implies that the Framers did not
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V. TRANSFORMATIVE MOMENTS AND THE PRSERVATION THEME IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
The ambiguity of "transformative constitutional moments" goes
beyond Reconstruction. It is one of the paradoxes of Anglo-American
constitutional history that proponents of radical change have regularly
portrayed themselves as conservators rather than transformers. The English
Revolution of the 1640s was fought to preserve "the Ancient
Constitution."9 As Michael Landon has described the Glorious Revolution
of 1688, the "concern was the preservation... of the privileges and power
of Parliament .... local liberties, franchises, and immunities, and the rights
and liberties of individuals" according to "'the laws of the kingdom'
handed down from the remotest English ancestors." 92 The American
revolutionaries themselves claimed to be defending the established
constitution of the Empire and the rights of Englishmen against tyrannical
innovations. They claimed rights "sanctified by long usage, a uniformity of
principle and practice from ages past."93 Custom, often from time
immemorial, was central to oppositionist British and American
understandings of liberty. John Phillip Reid wrote that "the principle of
custom was involved in every aspect of the American whig case,"94 as he
described what a reviewer called "the articulate legalistic-constitutionalist
attitude of those backward-looking 18th-century American whigs (and their
British sympathizers) who claimed to see the American Revolution as a
historic act of constitutional conservation."'95 The Framers of the
Constitution denied Anti-Federalist charges that they were violating the
principles of the American Revolution. As Gordon Wood explained in his
classic study, the Framers "appropriated and exploited the language that
more rightfully belonged to their opponents," and they attempted "to
confront and retard the thrust of the Revolution with the rhetoric of the
intend Article V to be the exclusive mode of altering the Constitution. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra
note 1, at 15, 72-75.
91. See GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603-1642, at 3, 230-31 (1993); J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION- AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH
HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 30-69, 255-305 (2d ed. 1987).
92. MICHAEL LANDON, THE TRIUMPH OF THE LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN ENGLISH POLITICS,
1678-1689, at 242-43 (1970); see also POCOCK, supra note 91, at 229-40 (arguing that the
Glorious Revolution was sustained by appeals to a largely mythical past).
93. Joseph Hawley, To the Inhabitants of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1775), in 2 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES (1839).
94. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 19
(abr. ed. 1995).
95. Stephen A. Conrad, The Constitutionalism of "the Common-Law Mind" 13 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 619, 623 (1988). That Americans understood themselves to be preserving traditional
liberty from tyrannical innovation emerges clearly from the classic work of BERNARD BAILYN,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (enl. ed. 1992).
2032 [Vol. 108:2011
1999] Benedict 2033
Revolution."96 The Jeffersonian Republican "revolution" of 1800 relied on
the traditional rhetoric of British liberty to preserve the principles of the
American Revolution against Federalist corruption.97  Antebellum
Republicans claimed to reflect the antislavery intentions of the American
Founders, which had been subverted by the slave power. Lincoln, the
master of masking radical policies in conservative rhetoric, urged: "Let us
[re]turn slavery... to the position our fathers gave it; and there let it rest in
peace. Let us re-adopt the Declaration of Independence, and with it, the
practices, and policy, which harmonize with it." 9 In all these cases, the
actual change was radical; the rhetoric was often conservative. We are not
transforming the Constitution, proponents of change insisted, we are
returning to or preserving its original perfection.
The problem posed by such rhetoric appears clearly when assessing the
role of the judiciary in converting the people's mandate into constitutional
law. Considering its scope for the first time in the Slaughter-House Cases,99
the Supreme Court asked, did Americans intend the Amendment "to
transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have
mentioned, from the States to the Federal Government?... [W]as it
96. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 562
(1969).
97. See LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY
IDEOLOGY 17, 92-125 (1978). Joyce Appleby has challenged Banning's conclusion that
Jeffersonian Republicans articulated traditional republican ideology, insisting that their ideas
embodied what became known as liberalism. See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW
SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s, 18-23 (1984); see also Cathy Matson &
Peter Onuf, Toward a Republican Empire: Interest and Ideology in Revolutionary America, 37
A . Q. 496 (1985) (arguing that the American revolutionary generation reconciled republican
ideology with individualistic entrepreneurial activity). Banning responded effectively in a
colloquy with Appleby. See Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and
Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1986). But see Joyce
Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 20 (1986). Rowland
Berthoff concluded that Americans continued to utilize traditional republican rhetoric well into
the 19th century, despite acting on the principles of liberalism. See Rowland Berthoff,
Independence, Virtue, and Interest: From Republican Citizen to Free Enterpriser, 1787-1837, in
UPROOTED AMERICANS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF OSCAR HANDLIN 97-124 (Richard L. Bushman et
al. eds., 1979).
98. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27, 1860), in 3
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 522 (arguing that the Framers tended to oppose the
extension of slavery; insisting that limiting slavery geographically was not tantamount to
abolishing it); Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Ill. (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 247, 276 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); Kenneth M. Stampp, Lincoln's
History, in "WE CANNOT ESCAPE HISTORY": LINCOLN AND THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH 17,
22 (James M. McPherson ed., 1995) (noting that Lincoln believed, probably incorrectly, that the
signatories to the Declaration of Independence intende4 the document to apply to blacks). Salmon
P. Chase was generally credited with developing the Republican constitutional argument, the
central tenet of which was the original intention of the Framers to divorce the federal government
completely from slavery, requiring it to promote freedom while slavery remained entirely a local
institution. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIViL WAR 73-102 (2d ed: 1995).
99. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil
rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?" 1 Only five years
after Republicans had minimized the radicalism of their Reconstruction
program, the Court could plausibly deny it. "We are convinced that no such
results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments,
nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them." '
Scholars who, like Ackerman, stress the radical, even revolutionary,
nature of Reconstruction legislation, have considered the Supreme Court
decisions of the 1870s and 1880s betrayals of the constitutional mandate." 2
Kaczorowski has concluded that the "revolutionary impact" of the Civil
War and Reconstruction on the American constitutional system was cut
short "due to conscious choices made by the... Supreme Court to...
curtail federal authority to secure civil rights," as the Court "emasculat[ed]
the Reconstruction civil rights program." 0 3 Professor Ackerman's
emphasis on the nationalizing aspect of the Reconstruction transformative
moment suggests that unlike most of these critics, he may consider the
Court's creation of a national body of property rights and commercial law,
and its general endorsement of expanded congressional authority over
interstate commerce, to have been logical consequences of the
Reconstruction-era transformation.
Those like myself, who have argued that Republicans' continued
commitment to federalism circumscribed the radicalism of Reconstruction,
see the Supreme Court's restrictive decisions in a different light. Twenty
years ago, I noted that Republicans like Thaddeus Stevens certainly meant
the Fourteenth Amendment to have a broader application than the Supreme
Court articulated in the Slaughter-House Cases. "But," I added, "Stevens
would have been just as incredulous to learn that he had given Congress or
the Supreme Court the power to nullify Louisiana's regulations of
slaughterhouses." l The ultimate consequences may have been tragic for
African Americans and the nation, but the Court merely "carried over to the
judicial arena Republicans' reluctance to alter fundamentally the federal
100. Id. at 77.
101. Id. at 78.
102. See CURTIS, supra note 30, at 171-96; ROBERT J. KACZOROWKI, THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL
RIGHTS 135-66, 173-93 (1985); see also FONER, supra note 49, at 529-31 (arguing that the
Supreme Court, responding to public opinion, "moved a long way toward emasculating the
postwar amendments"in the 1870s); KYVIG, supra note 2, at 182-87 (arguing that the
ambiguously worded Reconstruction amendments "provided less protection than intended"
because of narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court). William E. Nelson, who stresses the
ambiguity of the meaning of the 14th Amendment, nonetheless portrays the Court's
interpretations as "flatly inconsistent with the history of its framing .... NELSON, supra note 28,
at 163.
103. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 102, at xiii, 227.
104. Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,
1978 Sup. CT. REV. 39, 59.
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system." 05 Philip S. Paludan likewise has concluded that the Court rested
its opinions "on that same devotion to federalism which had pervaded
Reconstruction debate." 06 Indeed, given the general persistence of dual
federalism during the Reconstruction-era, I have argued that what was
remarkable was not the Court's circumscription of Reconstruction
legislation, but that the Justices went so far in articulating constitutional
doctrines that would have sustained broad federal authority to protect rights
if the political will to exercise it had persisted.0 7
Professor Ackerman promises to assess how well the Court preserved
the "spirit of 1866" in volume three of We The People.'"8 In this volume,
he is concerned "not [with] substance but process" 9 and alludes to the
Slaughter-House Cases only to point out that they manifested the Justices'
unanimous confirmation of the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment,
despite its unconventional ratification."0 It is an insightful and perhaps
unprecedented observation.
But how should the Justices have interpreted the constitutional
mandate? If the legitimacy of constitutional amendments is derived not
from having satisfied the requirements of Article V but from the will of the
people acting in a higher lawmaking capacity, then may the Court have
been correct in interpreting the Amendment restrictively, reflecting the
limited impact on federalism that Republicans told the voters it would
have? It was Andrew Johnson and the Democrats who regaled voters with
exaggerated claims of the Amendment's radicalism. Note that in his article
for this Symposium, Professor Foner quotes Johnson's denunciation of
Reconstruction legislation as evidence of its radicalism."' Should the post-
Reconstruction era Supreme Court have done likewise? Perhaps it should
have. While Johnson exaggerated and the Republicans minimized the
Amendment's potential impact, the voters clearly chose to risk the potential
radicalism when they backed it. Professor Ackerman consistently points to
the important role the opponents of constitutional transformation play in
upping the stakes. Are they equally important in clarifying the issues?
105. Benedict, supra note 63, at 67.
106. PALUDAN, supra note 75, at 56.
107. See Benedict, supra note 75, at 57-59.
108. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 251.
109. 2 id. at 245.
110. See 2 id. at 244-47.
111. See Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the Reconstruction Amendments, 108 YALE L.J.
1999, 2002 (1999)
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VI. CONVENTIONAL VERSUS UNCONVENTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS
The Supreme Court's narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in
the decades following Reconstruction raises a question about the
effectiveness of "unconventional" constitutional amendment. In his history
of constitutional amendments, Explicit and Authentic Acts,' David Kyvig
argues for the superiority of conventional over unconventional amendment.
He claims that the failure of New Deal Democrats to incorporate their
constitutional transformation into the text of the document was a crucial
error and argues that "[t]he consequence of this lapse of formal
constitutional redefinition was a reduced long term impact for the
innovations of the 1930s." "' It took fifty years, but when the political
coalition that supported New Deal liberalism disintegrated, conservatives
"had a far easier time... turning the policies and practices of the United
States in a contrary direction" than they would have had they faced a
constitutional text mandating redistributive social welfare policies."4 In
sum, Kyvig writes, "without explicit and authentic acts of amendment, any
constitutional construction remain[s] fundamentally insecure." 115
Imagine the same presidential and Southern resistance to the
Republican Reconstruction program and the same process of overcoming it,
but without Republican reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead,
suppose that they had relied on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
Reconstruction Acts of 1867, and a series of laws justified as enforcing the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2.116 After all, as Howard Jay Graham and others have pointed
out, in the opinion of many if not most Republicans, the Fourteenth
Amendment was merely "declaratory" of the correct law of American
112. KYVIG, supra note 2.
113. ld. at481.
114. Id. at482.
115. Id at 483 (discussing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
116. Reliance on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 would have
required it to be construed as referring to a general set of rights held by all American citizens.
Many Republicans held this view. James F. Wilson, the chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee and manager of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 in the House, explicitly relied on the old
Privileges and Immunities Clause to justify the measure's constitutionality. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18 (1866). John A. Bingham, the author of the first Section of the 14th
Amendment, interpreted the clause similarly, although he denied that Congress had the power to
enforce the provisions of Article IV. He intended the 14th Amendment specifically to secure that
power. See, e.g., CURTIs, supra note 30, at 62-64; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 69-71 (1993). Both Wilson and
Trumbull, the manager of the Civil Rights Bill in the Senate, relied on Section Two of the 13th
Amendment for the constitutional authority to enact it. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1118-19 (1866) (statement of Sen. VWilson); id. at 474-75 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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citizenship and the national duty to protect the rights associated with it."7 If
they had done so, the parallel between Reconstruction-era transformation
and that of the New Deal would be even closer and more compelling. Like
New Deal Democrats, Reconstruction-era Republicans would have claimed
that the constitutional interpretations of the previous decades had departed
from correct doctrines and that no constitutional amendment was necessary.
What might the effect have been on the Supreme Court's interpretation
of federal power to protect civil rights? Ackerman has already described
how the Supreme Court resisted the Republican Reconstruction process and
finally acquiesced in it.' Would the resistance have extended to ruling
federal civil rights legislation unconstitutional, with an even greater
constitutional confrontation between the Court and Congress ensuing? As
matters actually turned out, the Supreme Court gave way on the
Reconstruction process and signaled its acceptance of the Fourteenth
Amendment, acquiescing in the nationalization inherent in the
unconventional process Ackerman has described. But it then placed a
narrow construction on the Amendment that limits federal power to define
and protect rights to this day.'19
On one hand, the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was explicitly
embedded in the Constitution permitted the Supreme Court to revitalize its
protections of civil rights and liberty in the 1950s and 1960s in what has
many of the hallmarks of another constitutional transformation. Surely, that
transformation would have been immensely more difficult to achieve
without the Amendment in the text. On the other hand, would the
transformation of the 1950s and 1960s have been necessary had the Court
been forced to sustain broad federal power to protect rights in the 1860s? If
rights are largely what courts say they are, is not the establishment of robust
legal doctrine more important than the addition of mere words to the
constitutional text? This counterfactual proposition also begs the question
of whether, in light of the transformation, the Court would have
reinterpreted constitutional provisions, such as parts of the Bill of Rights, to
apply directly to the states, so that the protection of rights against state
infringement would not have depended solely on congressional action.
117. See HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, Our 'Declaratory' Fourteenth Amendment, in
EVERYiuAN's CONSTrrUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE
"CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN CONSTrrlONALISM 295 (1968).
118. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 223-27.
119. Besides attending to the classic line of post-Reconstruction cases discussed by the works
cited supra note 102, recall that the Supreme Court sustained the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not as
an exercise of Congress's power to enforce the 14th Amendment under Section Five, but as an
exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 300 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). Consider, in
this light, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), in which the Supreme Court
repudiated Congress's claim of authority under Section Five of the 14th Amendment to define
fundamental rights.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Whatever questions one might raise about the implications of Professor
Ackerman's theoretical propositions, the fact remains that he has done more
than any prior theorist to reconcile the legal theory of constitutional change
with the historical reality of constitutional change. Much of what he says
rings true. Whether or not one accepts his conclusions, he has demolished
the conventional legal account. Widespread recognition that orthodox
understandings of constitutional change are irreconcilable with history may
undermine the central effort of American constitutional theory-the
separation of constitutional law from ordinary politics-thus weakening the
maintenance of something more than political sanctions for constitutional
violations. Constitutional theorists must reconcile constitutional theory with
historical reality if we are to remain a nation under law. Others may offer
alternative resolutions, but it will be quite an accomplishment if they do so
with the panache and brilliance of this pioneering effort.
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